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1. Introduction 
 
The Spanish society has undergone a major overhaul in the three decades elapsed since 
the death of Franco. The transformation from dictatorship to a democracy and the 
devolution of government to the regions have combined with the sheer effect of the 
passage of time to transform an obsolete public sector into one comparable to that of 
developed countries. The health care system is one of the areas where reforms have been 
far reaching, and in this paper we aim to evaluate the change over time in one of the 
indicators that serve to assess its performance: the existence and degree of inequities in 
health care utilization. In particular we will evaluate whether there have been changes in 
the distribution of utilization for a given level of health care need. Secondly, we shall 
decompose the sources of inequality in utilization and explain the observed differences 
between 1987 and 2001. The choice of these two time periods is motivated by the fact 
that the most comprehensive pack of reforms for the health care system was 
systematized and put forward by the 1986 General Health Act, among whose main goals 
there are the wish to eliminate socio-economic health inequalities in access, as expressed 
in its “Artículo 3” and to correct inequalities in health “Artículo 12”. We shall use data 
from the 1987 Encuesta Nacional de Salud (CIS, 1987) to assess the degree of income 
related utilization inequality in the Spanish population shortly after this important law. 
We choose the 2001 edition of the same survey (CIS, 2001) in order to deal with 
comparable information. The comparison of two cross sections of the Spanish 
population has a limited ability to reflect the causal effect of a multi-faceted package of 
reforms. Nevertheless, our contention is that the implementation of these reforms 
should change the joint  distribution of utilization and socio-economic characteristics   3 
after controlling for health care needs, and in this paper we set out to measure such 
change.  
 
Our results show that by 2001 the system has improved in the sense that differences in 
income no longer lead to different access given the same level of need. However, the 
tenure of private health insurance leads to differences in access given the same level of 
need, and its contribution to inequity has increased over time, both because insurance is 
more concentrated among the rich and because the elasticity of utilization for the three 
services has increased too.  
 
Section 2 briefly summarizes the main characteristics of the health system and the 
reforms that have taken place in the recent past and provides a brief review of previous 
relevant studies. Section 3 presents the methodology that we adopt for the measurement 
of inequities in health care utilization and the explanation of their changes over time. 
Section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5 discusses the implications of our 
results. 
 
2. The transition of the Spanish health care system and previous literature on 
inequities in utilization 
 
At the end of the dictatorship in 1975, the Spanish health system was based on a social 
security scheme paid by employers and employees and complemented by a network of 
health care centers owned by different organizations. One of the characterizing features 
of the pre-democratic system was a strong bias towards hospital care. While the 70’s had   4 
witnessed the creation of a public network of modern hospitals, primary and preventive 
services in the public network were underdeveloped: general practitioners were typically 
available for two and a half hours per day at isolated outlets which lacked administrative 
and diagnostic support (EOHCS, 2000). The arrival of democracy unleashed the latent 
demand for a better health care system and important legislative and managerial changes 
ensued. The Ministry of Health was created in 1977 and the 1978 Constitution 
consecrated public coverage for all citizens. Momentum gathered after 1983 when the 
government started a set of reforms to integrate the different networks. By 1986 the 
General Health Act transformed the social security system into a National Health 
System.   
 
Thus, there are two main structural reforms with a potential impact on socio-economic 
inequalities in access to health care occurred during the period studied in this paper. 
Firstly, the system finally was consolidated as a tax-funded, universal coverage National 
Health System within which individuals are entitled to a comprehensive set of benefits 
including not only primary and specialized inpatient and outpatient care, but also 
subsidized medicines with zero co-payments for specific groups such as pensioners or 
disabled persons and reduced co-payments for drugs for chronic diseases including 
AIDS. Secondly, primary care has been totally reformed by means of substituting the 
obsolete outlets mentioned above by team based practices staffed by doctors and nurses 
who have received specific training in family medicine and whose activities not only 
included curative care, but also preventive care, health promotion, follow up of patients 
and services targeted to particular population groups such as the mentally ill, drug users 
etc. The implementation of the primary care reform all over Spain was slow: while it was   5 
planned as far back as 1984 and turned into law in 1986, only 50% of the population was 
covered by the new system in 1992 and the proportion reached 81% by 2000 (EOHCS, 
2000). This is in fact the most important reform taking place during the period under 
study. For these reasons it seems appropriate to evaluate the change between 1987 and 
2001.  
 
In this study we intend to pay special attention to the role of private health insurance 
(PHI) as a determinant of inequities in health care. PHI in Spain essentially provides 
“duplicate” or “double” coverage in the sense that it covers services that are 
concurrently provided by the public network. Nevertheless there are some features, such 
as the possibility of by-passing the GP before consulting a specialist or the access to 
better hospital amenities, which confer PHI a degree of supplementarity in the sense of 
Mossialos and Thompson (2002). The concern about the equity effects of PHI in Spain 
is justified by the fact that expenditure on PHI has received public subsidies in the form 
of tax bonuses. Prior to 1999 the subsidy operated via personal income tax: individuals 
received a 15% rebate on insurance premia (as well as on any other expenditure on 
health care). Currently, it operates via corporate tax: premia are considered tax free in 
kind salary and companies can substract from profits the cost of collective policies (thus 
obtaining a 35% tax bonus on their c ost). These subsidies might potentially induce 
undesired effects in terms of equity, because PHI alters the patterns of utilization, as 
shown by Rodríguez and Stoyanova (2004). Moreover, for the particular case of 
specialist visits, Jones et al. (2006) and Van Doorslaer et al. (2002) have obtained 
evidence that supports the notion that PHI in Spain actually generates pro-rich inequity 
in access.    6 
 
Apart from the studies cited above, there is a growing body of literature on the 
evaluation of the reforms in the Spanish National Health system since the Health Act of 
1986 in terms of inequities in utilization. The pioneering work of Rodríguez et al. (1993) 
offered evidence, with data from 1987, on the degree of inequity in public health care 
consumption as measured by the expenditure devoted to doctor visits and 
hospitalizations in the public network. A similar method was followed by Abásolo (1998) 
with data for 1993. More recently, Urbanos (1999, 2001a,b) has considered the dynamics 
of inequity and analyzed data for 1987, 1993, 1995 and 1997 within a unified 
methodological framework. Urbanos actually considers consumption data (number of 
visits and inpatient days) as well as an expenditure aggregate and her results suggest a 
decrease in inequity during the period 1993-1995. Moreover, for 1997 she finds that the 
inequity indices for visits to GPs and specialist and inpatient days are not statistically 
significant. In contrast, she finds that there is a significant degree of pro-rich inequity in 
emergency visits and that individuals without private health insurance are likely to over-
utilise public health care outlets, especially GP visits. Abásolo et al. (2001) test the 
existence of equity in utilization of and access to public-sector GPs in Spain in 1993 by 
analysing whether different socio-economic characteristics influence on the probability 
that the individual visited a public-sector GP during a two-week period. They find that 
individuals with private health insurance were less likely to visit a GP. Van Doorslaer et 
al. (2002), find a significant degree of pro-rich inequity in specialist visits and pro-poor 
inequality in GP visits using data from the 1996 Spanish wave of the ECHP. Van 
Doorslaer et al. (2004,2006) again find that there is a significant degree of pro-poor 
inequity in both the probability of visiting and the conditional number of visits to a GP   7 
whereas there is pro-rich inequity in both the probability of contacting a specialist and 
the conditional number of visits. Van Doorslaer, Koolman and Masseria (2004) obtain 
point estimates that would suggest evidence of pro-rich inequity in hospital admissions 
using data from the ECPH, but the null of no statistical significance cannot be rejected 
from these estimates.  
 
This paper contributes in a series of fronts to the existing literature. First, unlike 
Rodríguez et al. (1993) and Urbanos (1999, 2001a,b) and Abásolo et al. (2001), we do 
not restrict the analysis to publicly provided health care. As discussed above, the reason 
is that privately provided health care and PHI have received public subsidies during the 
period considered. Secondly, most of the existing studies do not address the equity 
effects of PHI, and this paper offers some methodological advantages with respect to 
those that do so, such as Van Doorslaer et al. (2002), which will be discussed later on. A 
third contribution consists in using two comparable health surveys with rich information 
on health status spanning 14 years since the General Health Act. Despite the obvious 
limitations of all before-after evaluations, this is a plausible empirical strategy to 




3.1 Measuring and decomposing inequalities in health care utilization 
The operational concept of inequity used in the recent literature is socio-economic 
inequality in utilization not justified by socio-economic inequalities in need. Therefore it 
is necessary to compute measures of socio-economic inequality in utilization, decompose   8 
these measures and subsequently  decide which components might be justified by 
unequal needs. The literature on health inequalities has recently adopted a standard tool 
for the measurement of socio-economic inequalities in health or health care utilization: 
the concentration index (CI) (Wagstaff et al., 1989). The concentration index has a 
similar interpretation to the more familiar Gini index for pure inequality. In fact, the two 
inequality measures differ in the fact that the ranking variable is a measure of socio-
economic status (usually income) (CI) rather than health/utilization (Gini). The CI 
ranges between  –1 and 1. A value of  –1 would mean that all health/health care 
utilization is concentrated in the poorest person, whereas a value of 1 would result if all 
health/utilization were concentrated in the richest person. A value of zero would mean 
that health/utilization is equally distributed over income in the sense that the pth 
percentage of the population ranked by income has exactly the pth percentage of total 
health/utilization for any p.  
 
Suppose we are interested in calculating the CI for a measure of health care utilization on 
income using individual data from the population of interest. Let yi denote a measure of 
utilization for the i
th individual, i=1,2,…N, and R’i denote the cumulative proportion of 
the population ranked by income up to the i
th individual (their ‘relative income rank’). 
 
The CI of utilization on income is given by (see e.g. Van Doorslaer and Jones, 2003), 
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(1) 
where  () i yEy = . 
 
We consider three types of health care utilization: visits to doctors, use of emergency 
services and hospitalisations. For each of these services, our measure of access consists 
in the probability of utilization at least once within a given time period. In the case of 
visits to doctors the time period is fifteen days whereas for the other two services, the 
time period is one year. For 2001, we are able to consider separately the probabilities of 
having visited a GP or a specialist, since the survey provides information on the 
speciality of the doctor in the last visit. While the health surveys offer information on the 
number of events for each of the three services, we abstain from considering measures 
of equity in the number of events. This is motivated by the fact that the distributions for 
the numbers of events are concentrated on 0 and 1. For instance, less than 5% (6% for 
2001) of individuals report more than one visit to the doctor and less than 2% (1% for 
2001) report more than two. The case of hospitalizations is even more extreme in this 
sense, as only for 2001 we do find individuals reporting more than one event, and these 
individuals make up for less than 2% of the sample. Furthermore, the studies that have 
considered both the probability of contact and the conditional number of events have 
found that, where there are inequities, these operate in the same direction for both 
dimensions of utilization (Van Doorslaer et al., 2004).  
 
) ' , cov( 2








=  10 
For each of the three types of health care, we specify a Linear Probability Model (LPM) 
in the following way 
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where yi=1(individual i reports at least one episode of health care j). It follows that  
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Our choice for the LPM is justified on the grounds that the linearity in parameters is 
particularly useful for our purposes of decomposing inequalities in the probability of 
utilization (this property has been exploited by Van Doorslaer et al. (2004) in their study 
of inequity in the utilization of inpatient services). Moreover, the well known limitation 
of the LPM model producing predicted probabilities outside the [0,1] interval is 
irrelevant in our case, since we are only interested in the parameters of the model, which 
are consistently estimated by OLS. In particular, as shown by Wagstaff et al. (2003), if 
the probability of utilization is described by equation (3), then an inequality index for the 
probability of utilization is given by  
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The term in brackets is the elasticity of P with respect to xk evaluated at the population 
means and CI’k denotes the concentration index of x k against income. Thus this   11 
inequality measure can be usefully broken down into the contributions of individual 
explanatory variables. Moreover, if we define the estimated health elasticity with respect 
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then we can rewrite the decomposition in a way such that the CI is just a weighted sum 
of the inequality in each of its determinants, with the weights equal to the elasticities, as 
expressed in the last part of equation (4). As mentioned by Van Doorslaer and Koolman 
(2004), the decomposition also clarifies how each correlate of health contributes to total 
income-related utilization inequality: this contribution is the result of (i) its impact on 
health, and (ii) how unequally distributed over income it is.  
 
Measures of horizontal inequity are easily obtained from the decomposition of income 
related inequality in utilization (Van Doorslaer et al. (2004), Gravelle (2003)). All that is 
required is an agreement on what variables in the model of utilization can be considered 
as legitimate determinants of unequal access from a normative point of view. Assume 
that the vector x=(x1, ….xk) can be partitioned into non-need and need variables x=(x
nn, 
x
n)= (x1, x2, …xk1, xk1+1….xk). An index of horizontal inequity is given by the part of 
socio-economic inequality in utilization not justified by socio-economic inequalities in 
need. That is 
   12 
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This method differs in an important way from the method of “indirect standardization” 
by Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer (1996). The method of indirect standardization consists 
in first computing the concentration index of actual utilization and then substracting 
from it the concentration index of predicted utilization, where predicted utilization is 
obtained from the estimation of an econometric model for utilization as a function of 
need variables. This procedure has been criticised on the grounds that the omission of 
variables which, despite not qualifying as need indicators from a normative point of view 
are nevertheless associated to utilization, can lead to biased estimation (Schokkaert and 
Van de Voorde, 2004; Gravelle, 2003). This is particularly relevant for the purposes of 
this study. Since we wish to evaluate the impact of PHI on utilization, and since PHI 
tenure is strongly associated to income and other socio-economic characteristics, 
omission of income –a non need variable- from the utilization equation can lead to 
biased estimates for the impact of PHI. The existing studies for the case of Spain mostly 
rely on the indirect standardization method. Indeed, only Van Doorslaer et al. (2004, 
2006) use the method discussed above, but their analysis does not consider the effect of 
PHI.  
 
In relation to the point discussed in the previous paragraph, we must note that the 
literature on utilization generally treats PHI as an endogenous variable (see Vera-
Hernández 1999 for the case of Spain). This is motivated by the recognition that   13 
unobserved factors that affect the purchase of PHI are correlated with unobserved 
factors that affect utilization (adverse selection bias). Our steps to address this issue 
consist in enriching the specification for utilization with an ample set of health status 
indicators in an attempt to capture all relevant risk factors. This should purge the 
estimate for the effect of PHI from biases arising from the omission from the utilization 
equations of health factors that simultaneously drive the propensity to purchase PHI. 
We subsequently test this assumption.  
 
3.2 Decomposing inequity over time  
 
The previous section shows how horizontal inequity in utilization can be expressed as 
the contribution of non-need variables to an index of socio-economic inequality in 
utilization. It is then straightforward to use the approach proposed by Wagstaff et al. 
(2003) in order to decompose the difference in inequity between two periods. The 
method is a derivation of the well known Oaxaca decomposition whereby the difference 
between the CI’s of the population at period t and period t-1 can be written as   
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Then, the contribution of any variable to the difference in inequity is given by  : 
( ) ( ) 1 1 1 - - - - + - = D kt kt kt kt kt kt nn CI CI CI CI
k h h h  
(8)   14 
 
In practice, we shall compute the differences in inequity (and contributions toward such 
difference) between 2001 and 1987. Moreover, in order to assess the relative importance 
of the inequality versus the health elasticity component in the contribution of each 
variable, we also compute the relative excess elasticity compared to year 1987, i.e. (hk2001-
hk1987)/ |hk1987 |, and the relative excess inequality, (CIk2001-CI k1987)/ |CI k1987| 
 
3.3 Statistical Inference  
 
Many of the statistics that we are going to report are non-linear functions of the data 
whose s ampling distributions are hard to obtain. For this reason we shall use 
bootstrapping methods in order to derive standard errors. The bootstrap estimates for 
standard errors are computed following the five-step approach used by Van Doorslaer 
and Koolman (2004). The number of replications has been set to 500.   
 
3.4. Data and variable definitions 
 
We use the 2001 and the 1987 editions of the Encuesta Nacional de Salud (CIS, 1987, 
2001). These are nation wide surveys collecting information on health and 
socioeconomic characteristics of individuals. The surveys contain separate adults (16+) 
and children samples. The analysis in this paper is based on the adult samples.  The 
sampling scheme is a multi-stage stratified process whereby primary strata are 
Autonomous Communities (2001 edition) or Provinces (1987 edition).  Within primary 
strata, sub-strata are defined according to residence area population size. Within   15 
substrata, municipalities (primary sampling units) and sections (secondary sampling 
units) are selected according to a proportional random sampling scheme. Finally, 
individuals are randomly selected from the sections. The survey documentation includes 
weighting factors that correct for the fact that the number of observations within the 
primary strata is not proportional to actual population. We use these weights whenever a 
nationwide statistic is computed. The information contained in the data files do not 
allow the identification of all the primary sampling units (because municipalities with a 
population below 100000 are not identified). Similarly, information about the secondary 
sampling units is omitted so it is impossible to control for cluster effects at either the 
municipality level or the section level.  
 
The ranking variable is equivalised total m onthly income earned by the household 
(income hereafter). In the ENS this is measured as a categorical variable with 12 
response categories in 1987 and 6 response categories in 2001. In order to obtain a 
continuous measure for income and also overcome the fact that for both editions there 
is a substantial proportion of item non-response, we specify an interval regression model 
using a wide range of explanatory variables referring both to the respondent and the 
head of household. These variables are relationship between interviewee and head of 
household, education of head of household, occupation of head of household, 
employment status of head of household, tenure of private health insurance, age and sex 
of the head of household and regional dummies. Except for the upper quantiles, the 
distributions for the predictions of income compare well with data from the continuous 
household expenditure survey (ECPF) of 1987 and data from the Spanish sample of the   16 
2001 wave of the European Community Household Panel.  The evolution of income 
inequality as measured by the Gini index also compares well with external sources.  
 
The initial 1987 ENS sample included 29647 individuals. From the initial sample, 5 
observations were dropped as income could not be predicted, and after deleting those 
not responding to one of the relevant questions the final sample contains 29185 
observations in the visits to doctors estimation, 28849 in hopitalisation and 29122 in use 
of emergency services. On the other hand, the initial 2001 ENS sample included 21067 
individuals from all the Autonomous Communities, although the observations from 
Ceuta and Melilla were dropped as there were not individuals from these two regions in 
the 1987 sample. From the remaining 20748, after deleting those not responding to one 
of the relevant questions the final sample contains 20644 in the visits to doctor 
estimation, 20635 in hospitalization, 20636  in emergency visits, 20644 in GP visits, 
20644 in specialist visits.  
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
As discussed in section 3.1, we specify and estimate LPM for the probability of visiting a 
doctor during the last fortnight, hospitalization over the last 12 months and emergency 
services utilization over the last 12 months.. The explanatory variables in the models are: 
i) the logarithm of equivalent household income; ii) 14 age-sex categories corresponding 
to age groups 16-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65-69, 
70-74, 75-79, 80+ for men and women (the omitted category corresponds to a woman   17 
aged between 16 and 19). iii) 4 marital status categories: single, married, divorced, 
widowed (single or divorced are the omitted categories);  iv) 5 categories of self assessed 
health: very good (omitted category), good, fair, bad, very bad; v) 5 chronic  illness: 
cholesterol, high blood pressure, diabetes, bronchitis or asthma, heart diseases and 
allergy; vi) whether daily activities or leisure had been limited by any of the chronic 
diseases in the last 12 months; vii) whether daily activities or leisure had been limited 
because of pain in the last two weeks; viii) whether the individual had to stay in bed for 
more than half day in the last two weeks; ix) whether the individual had an accident in 
the last year; x) tenure of private health insurance.  
 
Table A1 contains the parameter estimates for the equations corresponding to each of 
the services by OLS. Table A2 reports the results for the tests, based on Hausman 
(1978) and outlined in Wooldridge (2003), of the assumption of exogeneity of private 
health insurance in the specified utilisation equations. These tests require the use of 
excluded instruments for PHI and, in line with previous studies (Vera-Hernández 1999, 
Jones et al. 2006) we use occupational characteristics of the head of the household as 
variables that affect the purchase of PHI but do not affect directly individual utilisation. 
The first line in each of the 1987 and 2001 panels in table A2 report the test for the null 
of no significance of these instruments in the reduced form equation for PHI.  The rest 
of statistics are the t-values for the tests of significance of the reduced form equation for 
PHI residual in each of the utilisation equations (i.e. tests for the null of exogeneity of 
PHI in these equations). All these statistics are robust to the in-built heteroscedasticity of 
the linear probability model. As the figures in the table reveal, the p-values for the null   18 
hypothesis are above the 5% level except in the case of emergency visits in 2001. This 
suggests that the inferences for emergency visits should be treated with caution.     
 
 The estimates for the models permit the calculation of the inequality measures 
presented in table 1.  Note that in both 1987 and 2001, the utilization of the three types 
of services (visits to doctors, emergencies and hospitalizations) is unequally pro-poor 
distributed. The concentration indices are statistically significant and the point estimates 
are greater for 2001, revealing that the degree of pro-poor inequality is exacerbated over 
time.  Figure 1 presents the contribution of each group of variables to the overall CI. 
These figures reveal that a very large portion of the CI is explained by need, which is 
concentrated among the poor.  
 
Insert figure 1 around here 
 
The second row of table 1 presents the inequity measure for each of the services as 
defined in section 3.1. For each of the services, HI (inequity index) is the part of the CI 
(inequality index) explained by income and tenure of private health insurance (i.e. the 
non-need and non-demographic variables in our specifications for the probability of 
utilization).  
   19 
Table 1. Concentration indices, inequity indices and changes over time 
      1987         2001     
  
Visits  Hosp.  Em. visits  Visits  Hosp.  Em. visits  GP visits  Spec. visit 
CI  -0.0626  -0.0342  -0.0219  -0.0959  -0.0847  -0.0465  -0.1478  0.0121 
HI  0.0146  0.0246  -0.001  -0.0002  0.0281  -0.0065  -0.0479  0.0991 
Income  0.0115*  0.0125  0.0011  -0.0102  0.0078  -0.0182  -0.0439  0.0602 
PHI  0.0031  0.0121  -0.0021  0.0099  0.0203  0.0117  -0.0039  0.0388 
  Change over time (2001-1987) 
  Total visits  Hospital  Emergency visits 
CI2001-CI 1987  -0.0333  -0.0504*  -0.0246 
HI2001-HI 1987  -0.0149  0.0035  -0.0055 
Relative excess elasticity 
income 
-2.0125  -0.2870  -20.1116 
Relative excess elasticity 
PHI 
1.8760  0.4902  6.1485 
Relative excess inequality 
Income 
-0.1293 
Relative excess inequality 
PHI 
0.1141 
Note: Values significantly different from zero (at P<0.05) in bold typeface. * (at P<0.10) 
 
Note that in 1987 the HI indices for total visits and hospitalizations reveal a significant 
degree of pro-rich inequity. In these cases, both income and tenure of PHI contribute 
positively to the HI index. This means, in 1987, that while overall utilization is 
concentrated among the poor, rich individuals and/or individuals who enjoyed private 
health insurance (who tend to be richer than average) had more chances of using these 
health services than poor individuals and/or individuals without PHI at the same level 
of need. In contrast, the HI indices for the three services are statistically not different 
from zero in 2001, implying that for a given level of need, there are neither pro-rich nor   20 
pro-poor differences in the chances of utilization explained by income or insurance 
status.  
 
In order to analyze with more detail the changes over time for these indices it is useful to 
isolate the sources of their changes. As discussed in section 3.2, the contribution of each 
covariate to the index is given by the product of the elasticity of the probability of 
utilization and the concentration index of the covariate. So, it might be the case that the 
impact of income, say, on the chances of using a particular service do not change but 
income becomes better distributed. This would lead, ceteris paribus, to a reduction in the 
contribution of income to the degree of pro rich inequality in the chances of utilization. 
The bottom panel of table 1 presents the relevant decompositions for the two non-need 
covariates that we have used in the specification. The table offers a clear indication of 
the direction in which the relevant magnitudes have evolved over time. First note that 
the distribution of equivalised household income has become more equal. Relative to 
1987, the concentration index of log equivalised household income is 13% smaller in 
2001. The tenure of PHI, however, has evolved in the opposite direction. Relative to 
1987, the distribution of PHI is 11% more pro-rich.  
 
Doctor visits: As seen in table 1, the HI for the probability of visiting a doctor is positive 
and significant in 1987, with both income and PHI contributing positively. In 2001 the 
HI index is not statistically significant, but this is the result of two antagonistic effects. 
While in 2001 the contribution of income is negative (and not significant), the 
contribution of PHI is still positive and significant. In the bottom panel of the table we 
can see that the change in the contribution of income is driven by a 200% reduction in   21 
the size of the elasticity of the probability of utilization (as well as the decrease in income 
inequality). In contrast, as well as becoming more concentrated among the rich, the 
tenure of PHI exerts a greater impact on the probability of utilization. The relative 
change in elasticity is 180%. 
 
Hospitalizations:  The case of hospitalizations is similar to doctor visits.  There is a 
reduction in the contribution of income driven by a 28% reduction in elasticity (plus the 
reduction in income inequality) but the PHI elasticity of the probability of utilization 
actually increases by 50%. In 2001 the contribution of PHI is statistically significant, but 
the lack of significance of the income contribution renders the HI insignificant. 
 
Emergencies: The HI index is not statistically significant either in 1987 or 2001. But while 
in 1987 the contributions of income and PHI are both  insignificant, in 2001 the 
contribution of PHI is positive and significant. However, as noted before, the exogeneity 
assumption of PHI in the equation for emergencies in 2001 is rejected, so these 
inferences are to be taken with caution. 
 
In addition to these three services, we have obtained evidence for the GP visits and 
specialist visits separately for the year 2001 (unfortunately the data for 1987 does not 
distinguish between GP visits and specialist visits). The results are consistent with the 
evidence obtained by Van Doorslaer et al. (2004), Rodríguez and Stoyanova (2004) and 
Jones et al. (2006). That is, GP visits are concentrated among the poor. This is not only 
due to need being concentrated among the poor, since the HI index is negative and 
significant. That is, the poor and those without PHI have more chances of visiting the   22 
GP than the rich and/or PHI holders with the same level of need. Of course, this 
imbalance is compensated by the existence of a good degree of pro-rich inequity in the 
probability of visiting a specialist. Indeed, the inequity index for the probability of 
visiting a specialist in 2001 is greater than any of the other HI indices presented in table 
1. Note that roughly two fifths of this index is accounted by the contribution of PHI. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
The results presented in the previous section suggest that the Spanish health system 
seems to have achieved the goal of ensuring equal access to doctors, hospitals and 
emergency services for equal need. In fact, the reason why the HI indices for the three 
services are not statistically significant in 2001 is because the contribution of income is 
negative (total visits and emergencies) and or insignificant (all three services). With the 
necessary caveats derived from the fact that this is a pure before-after evaluation 
exercise, and at least as far as the point estimates suggest, it seems that the reforms 
during the period 1987-2001 have reduced the income elasticity for the probabilities of 
utilization of the three services. Coupled with a reduction in pure income inequality, this 
means that income, by 2001, does not lead to differences in utilization for the same level 
of need. This is clearly an improvement with respect to 1987, a year for which our 
estimates show a positive and significant contribution of income to inequity in the access 
to doctors. 
 
On a closer look, however, we note that the contribution of PHI to inequality in 
utilization is positive and significant for the three services. The data reveal that tenure of   23 
PHI has become more concentrated among the rich and, simultaneously, our estimates 
suggest an increase in the PHI elasticity of the probability of utilization for the three 
services. This leads to a positive and significant contribution of PHI to our measure of 
inequity in 2001 for the three services. Moreover, if we consider the chances of visiting a 
specialist in 2001, the data reveal a substantial degree of inequity with positive 
contributions of both income and PHI.  
 
The implications of these findings for the policy goals stated in the Health Act of 1986 
depend on a judgement value about whether public policy should be concerned with the 
inequity effect of PHI. After all, the services afforded by PHI are privately provided. A 
crucial point here is that these services are partially publicly financed through the tax 
bonuses to PHI. Must the public purse subsidize better access to some citizens? If so, 
does it matter that these citizens tend to be richer than the average? Obviously, equity is 
not the only r elevant issue when assessing the adequacy of PHI subsidies. Other 
considerations include the wish to support a private sector that might introduce 
competition in the health care market, or the wish to deviate demand to private outlets 
in order to decongest the public network. Concerning the latter, the evidence for the 
Spanish case (López-Nicolás and Vera-Hernández 2004) suggests that the subsidies are 
far from self-financing: their study shows that for each euro given away as a subsidy to 
the purchase of P HI, the public health care network experiences a reduction in 
utilisation worth 0,12 €. Similar evidence is available for the UK (Emmerson et al., 
2001), where tax bonuses were eliminated recently.     
   24 
While the overall picture obtained in this paper is that the Spanish National Health 
Service has advanced in the line of making access equitable, further research must find 
evidence to justify the subsidies to PHI, an element of the system that this research 
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Table A1: Linear Probability Model results for the probability of doctor utilisation in 1987 and 2001 
  1987  2001 
  Total visits  Hospital  Emergency visits  Total visits  Hospital  Emergency visits  GP visits  Specialist visit 
Log income  0.0078*  0.0034  0.0005  -0.0098  0.0027  -0.0143  -0.0288  0.0189 
F20_24  0.0239  0.0288  -0.0041  0.0093  0.0106  0.0194  -0.0059  0.0152 
F25_29  0.0283  0.0467  0.0033  -0.0030  0.0523  0.0060  -0.0188  0.0158 
F30_34  -0.0167  0.0030  -0.0098  -0.0079  0.0561  -0.0059  -0.0265*  0.0186 
F35_39  -0.0005  -0.0026  -0.0236*  -0.0229  0.0152  -0.0736  -0.0220  -0.0009 
F40_44  -0.0204  -0.0443  -0.0607  -0.0091  -0.0255  -0.0798  -0.0359  0.0268 
F45_49  -0.0195  -0.0626  -0.0681  0.0260  -0.0352  -0.1108  -0.0050  0.0310 
F50_54  0.0003  -0.0623  -0.0657  0.0284  -0.0209  -0.0703  0.0030  0.0254* 
F55_59  -0.0171  -0.0711  -0.0636  -0.0037  -0.0490  -0.1162  -0.0116  0.0078 
F60_64  -0.0059  -0.0688  -0.0713  0.0482  -0.0239  -0.1423  0.0252  0.0231 
F65_69  0.0278*  -0.0739  -0.1048  0.0370*  -0.0343  -0.1013  0.0231  0.0139 
F70_74  0.0630  -0.0824  -0.1117  0.0718  -0.0278*  -0.1415  0.0402*  0.0316 
F75_79  -0.0005  -0.0800  -0.0981  0.0338  -0.0272  -0.1630  0.0421*  -0.0084 
F80  -0.0190  -0.0793  -0.1264  0.0261  -0.0514  -0.1660  0.0505*  -0.0244 
M16_19  -0.0109  -0.0066  0.0026  -0.0335*  0.0059  -0.0246  -0.0388  0.0053 
M20_24  -0.0209*  -0.0077  0.0052  -0.0654  -0.0077  -0.0303  -0.0590  -0.0064 
M25_29  -0.0215*  -0.0197  -0.0146  -0.0625  -0.0113  -0.0325*  -0.0493  -0.0132 
M30_34  -0.0372  -0.0476  -0.0388  -0.0428  -0.0179*  -0.0564  -0.0414  -0.0014 
M35_39  -0.0365  -0.0522  -0.0491  -0.0340*  -0.0056  -0.0690  -0.0325  -0.0015 
M40_44  -0.0326  -0.0422  -0.0558  -0.0505  -0.0229*  -0.0886  -0.0474  -0.0031 
M45_49  -0.0340  -0.0555  -0.0698  -0.0403  0.0020  -0.0798  -0.0427  0.0024 
M50_54  -0.0413  -0.0388  -0.0624  -0.0413  -0.0173  -0.0933  -0.0337*  -0.0076 
M55_59  -0.0188  -0.0365  -0.0800  -0.0354  -0.0191  -0.1329  -0.0507  0.0154 
M60_64  -0.0027  -0.0635  -0.0833  -0.0201  -0.0132  -0.1339  -0.0212  0.0011 
M65_69  -0.0154  -0.0456  -0.0943  0.0446*  0.0111  -0.1267  0.0312  0.0135 
M70_74  0.0124  -0.0426  -0.0820  0.0221  -0.0034  -0.1246  -0.0086  0.0307*   27
  1987  2001 
  Total visits  Hospital  Emergency visits  Total visits  Hospital  Emergency visits  GP visits  Specialist visit 
M75_79  0.0275  -0.0348  -0.0751  0.0303  0.0003  -0.1145  0.0319  -0.0016 
M80  0.0027  -0.0039  -0.0657  -0.0147  0.0277  -0.1056  0.0116  -0.0263 
Married  0.0263  0.0520  0.0295  0.0117  0.0198  0.0169  0.0055  0.0062 
Widow  0.0359  0.0362  0.0228  0.0013  -0.0019  0.0077  -0.0015  0.0028 
Cholesterol  0.0347  -0.0123*  -0.0103  0.0167  -0.0127*  0.0100  0.0339  -0.0172 
high blood pressure  0.0647  -0.0106*  0.0006  0.0465  -0.0067  0.0074  0.0584  -0.0119* 
Diabetes  0.0508  0.0126  0.0159  0.0298  0.0185*  0.0007  0.0482  -0.0184* 
bronquitis o asma  0.0383  0.0034  0.0265  0.0260*  0.0165  0.0653  0.0318  -0.0059 
Heart  0.0458  0.0582  0.0681  0.0267*  0.1011  0.1038  -0.0154  0.0422 
Allergy  0.0166  -0.0044  0.0263  0.0297  -0.0293  0.0116  0.0223  0.0074 
limited by cronic  0.0219  0.0687  0.0649  0.0293  0.0558  0.0901  0.0260  0.0033 
Limited by pain  0.1849  0.0082  0.0316  0.2564  0.0024  0.1102  0.1877  0.0687 
Sah good  0.0242  0.0134  0.0215  0.0505  0.0170  0.0333  0.0295  0.0210 
Sah fair  0.1304  0.0440  0.0510  0.1530  0.0926  0.1364  0.0783  0.0747 
Sah poor  0.2114  0.1461  0.1273  0.2073  0.2029  0.2102  0.0948  0.1125 
Sah very poor  0.1717  0.1786  0.1866  0.0231  0.1032  0.0544*  -0.0189  0.0419 
Bed  0.2016  0.0385  0.0700  0.1780  0.0603  0.0420  0.1216  0.0564 
Accident  0.0663  0.0830  0.2985  0.0580  0.0651  0.4220  0.0082  0.0498 
private insurance  0.0101  0.0160  -0.0041  0.0441  0.0328  0.0423  -0.0119*  0.0560 
Note: Values significantly different from zero (at P<0.05) in bold typeface. * (at P<0.10)   28
Table A2. Tests for the assumption of exogeneity of private health insurance in the utilisation equations 
      1987          
Het.- robust F stat. For null of joint no significance of instruments in reduced form    F(6.28004)=112.11        
P-value      0          
   Total visits  Hospital  Emergency Visits       
Het. Robust t-value for null of no significance of residual from reduced form in 
utilisation equation  1.17  0.1  0.71      
P-value  0.24  0.92  0.47       
           
           
      2001          
Het.- robust F stat. For null of joint no significance of instruments in reduced form    F(6.20584)=9.71        
P-value      0          
   Total visits  Hospital  Emergency Visits  GP visits  Specialists 
Het. Robust t-value for null of no significance of residual from reduced form in 
utilisation equation  1.05  1.71  2.44  0.24  1.91 
P-value   0.29  0.08  0.015  0.81  0.056 
Note: All test statistics are robust to heteroscedasticity. The set of excluded instruments used for testing are a set of 6 occupational dummy variables for the head of the household.  29 
 
Figure 1. Contributions to Concentration Indices 
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